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T. S. 101062

9 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: GEN. JAMES DOOLITTLE

1. Up to recently, peace and security have been maintained through our strength, industrial as well as military; but today we are confronted with a type of threat which cannot be met by conventional military countermeasures. A new form of conflict has been invented in the form of the Cold War. In this form, nations are free to defame each other, subvert nationals and commit acts of sabotage and violence which would clearly constitute acts of open warfare a generation ago. New standards and tolerances are being created just shy of what used to be called war.

2. Whether the pattern was made by the deep-rooted revolutionary movement of the Marxists which culminated in the Russian Revolution, or the obvious desire of civilized people to avoid all-out war, is perhaps aside from the point. The important fact is that Cold War is upon us and may stay with us permanently as a lesser evil than the hot war.

3. As it now stands, the threat of powerful military forces held in leash by a civil government, which does not want to turn them loose, is becoming weaker every day. Under the circumstances, there appears but one solution - to create a fourth service dedicated to the same kind of warfare practiced by our enemies and accepted as the new form of war - conflict with some restrictions, but the same intent.

4. We too must subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies behind a smoke screen if we are to survive. We must somehow make an all-out effort to secure current knowledge of the enemy, his actions and intents in spite of difficulties, and we must - if need be - be ruthless about it, if we would survive. Top flight intelligence will not only enable us to avoid war, but to augment the power of our military arm. It follows that if an all-out hot war should succeed a period of Cold War, it is essential to apply every possible means for the collection of intelligence to determine when the transition will take place.

5. The realization of the necessity for such actions prompted the 10/2 directive which is clear and definite. The responsibility for

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carrying it out was given to CIA. In effect CIA constitutes the fourth service at present. In a measure, it has been recognized as such, but it can only be really effective if it is built up in proportion to its mission, tasks and responsibilities.

6. Basically this means an adequate number of competent personnel and an adequate budget. It is probably not possible to gauge the size of the budget or the number of personnel necessary to carry out a hypothetical mission of fighting an adequate Cold War. We can, however, visualize that the effort in men and money should be, if necessary, of the same order as that of any of the other services.

7. With the enormous task of carrying on a continuing Cold War before us, our inadequate facilities and the situation in which we as a nation find ourselves, leave little alternative. Either we tool up for Cold Warfare and do a good job, or get sucked in nearer and nearer to an all-out conflict with its fatal end.

8. Unfortunately it is not possible to achieve results either by the mere expenditure of money or by the mere presence of bodies to fill a complement. Money must be intelligently converted into useful effort, and personnel must be rigidly selected. If, therefore, we agree that Cold War must be fought by Cold War methods and with Cold War personnel, there is only one logical step to take: expand the budget each year, depending on our ability to convert money efficiently; and remove the ceiling on personnel to permit building up and upgrading the Agency's manpower, by the laborious task of skillful recruiting, training and carefully selecting personnel.

9. The vital process of building up manpower is a slow one, for the recruiting, selection and training of men is difficult and exacting. Rule of thumb standards and mass recruiting spell mediocrity, and we can never hope to be successful through the acceptance of mediocrity in personnel.

10. During the past two years I have been connected with the Agency, the urgency of the situation has grown on me until I feel today that we are almost too late, all because we cannot appreciate the magnitude or the importance of what our Cold War effort should be for our Nation to survive.

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11. As the first steps to take, I suggest the following:

a) Consider the CIA fourth defense service, now in active conflict in the Cold War and provide for it accordingly;

b) Remove ceilings of personnel to permit expansion. This process cannot be rapid if intelligently conducted and its ultimate completion does not have to be considered now;

c) Exercise the freedoms and prerogatives provided for in the CIA charter to secure high grade personnel and discard the less desirable and to convert funds to useful purposes;

d) Gauge magnitude and quality of effort by results.

12. The foregoing is not intended to serve as a detailed plan, but to urge a start and indicate a direction. To build up an organization to cope with the task before us, we must have a realistic concept of the scale of operations and the conviction that with adequate effort, we can stave off a hot war. If we can achieve that, the rest will follow.

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